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Introduction
Many environmental scholars and activists have suggested the need of a 
profound shift of consciousness when it comes to our relationships with 
Nature (Naess 2008, Merchant 2005, Mathews 2005, Eckersley 2003, 
Goldsmith 1996). In addition of greening our political ideas, institutions and 
technologies, they suggest that we need to critically engage the paradigms 
by which we conceive Nature. The task of clarifying what we mean by Nature 
has however become increasingly difficult due to the supremacy of an 
epistemology hostile to metaphysical reflections (Hay 2007, Marsh and 
Furlong 2002), and the spread of a constructivist and relativistic 
understanding of the many ways in which humans comprehend Nature (Daly 
2008, Dingler 2005, Soper 1995, Meyer 2001). Answering what Nature is has 
become a daring question, not only  because of the supremacy of an 
epistemology increasingly  de-anchored from ontology, but also following the 
various abuses generated by various essentialist interpretations of what 
Nature ought to be. As a result, many scholars now prudently  claim to speak 
only about the social and political “effects” of evoking “Nature.” Others are 
ready to discard this notion altogether, assimilating what would be “Nature” 
into a cultural scheme prone to challenge all forms of dualism as arbitrary 
exclusion and all forms of monism as forced inclusion (Morton 2007).
Yet recent ecological findings appear to favor a comeback to ontology. 
They suggest the existence of an ontological state of interconnection and 
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interdependency forms the bedrock of Life itself (McIntosh 1985; Capra 96).1 
Many case studies reinforce that assumption by showing that specific 
patterns of human consummation and exploitation are damaging sometimes 
irreversibly the plasticity  and adaptability of the interrelationships upon which 
the diversity of life on Earth depends (Rogers and Laffoley 2011, Gardner, 
Starke and Rosbotham 2011, Starke and Mastny 2010 Cowie 2007, Corvalan 
2005). Their findings indicate that the ways in which we live our lives have 
consequences not only for us as specie, but also for complex symbiotic 
networks affecting the wellbeing of numerous life forms and organisms. The 
main idea is that all living and non-livings beings would be intrinsically 
connected and interdependent in fundamental ways. This realization has 
triggered various attempts to reconfigure the boundaries of ethics, morality 
and politics from an ecological standpoint. Still, the notion of ontological 
relatedness remains difficult to grasp. We may understand the isolated 
consequence of a detrimental ecological behavior in connection to another 
one, but many of us still struggle to make sense of the shockwaves or ripple 
effects we are sending in a seemingly open, mobile and even chaotic nexus 
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1 The discipline of ecology as a “science” (emerging through the development of main 
disciplines such as limnology, oceanography and animal ecology) has itself been subject to 
many debates and disputes between the defenders of ecology as an experimental science, 
and the proponents of a more synthetic or holistic examination of the various relations 
between ecosystems and populations (McIntosh 1985).
Despite the methodological, epistemological and ontological disagreements marking the 
development of a self-conscious ecology as a scientific discipline, it is possible to identify 
four broad assumptions attributed to ecologists: 1) everything is connected to everything 
else; 2) everything must go somewhere; 3) Nature knows best; 4) and there is no such thing 
as a free lunch (Carter 1999, pp.19-23; Commoner 1971). Of course, the question of what 
Nature is, and how we can attribute a form of consciousness to Nature (that is without a 
clear center of agency that can be verified and tested) remains an open debate. And so is 
the question of knowing what interconnectedness exactly means or implies? Heavily 
influenced by Darwinism, notions such as evolution and the struggle for existence drawn into 
the development of the early science of ecology, were all predicated on positive and 
individualizing assessments of plants, insects or animals striving for survival, not an overall 
assessment of species in teleological or overarching directional terms (McIntosh 1985, p. 
43). The science of ecology was penetrated by the analytical influences and methodologies 
attributed to the Scientific Revolution, leading to the now dominant epistemic paradigm of 
“modern science.” 
of interrelationships forming what has been described as a “web  of life.”2 The 
assumption that we first need to isolate the units, elements, numbers, agents, 
structures, causes and effects, referents, actors or persons in a self-enclosed 
or self-referential ways to formulate discriminating statements about the 
world makes it so much harder to understand the proposition that our 
ecological wellbeing is weaved at an ontological level that might precede 
what we perceive as isolated entities. To generate a foreseeing ecological 
wisdom capable of integrating the notion of ontological relatedness capable 
of supporting actions and policy remains therefore a tricky project, especially 
when the privileged scientific methodology is bounded by an empirical 
reductionism and verifiabilism hostile to metaphysical synthesis concerning 
Nature (empirical reductionism), when we believe that Nature is merely a 
conceptual fiction (idealistic reductionism), or when we look at Nature as a 
threat to our political freedoms which need to be protected against any 
derivative notions that could superimpose or dictate our choices, preferences 
or lifestyles (anthropocentric politics).
These difficulties have prompted me to explore what I call the 
ontological valuations informing our understandings of Nature. In this paper, I 
have chosen to focus on an ontological valuation I believe has influenced 
significantly our understandings of Nature: the valuation of what-stands-on-
its-own. By “ontological valuation,” I mean the ways in which our 
understandings of Nature are weaved with normative assumptions or posited 
preferences that structure or shape the way we think. In other words, our 
understandings of reality  or Nature always contain a number of principles or 
ideas that inform and organize our readings of Nature. I believe that better 
grasping these ideas or principles is important if we wish to embrace a shift 
of consciousness in any deliberate way. 
To better circumscribe the ontological valuation I wish to problematize, 
I will draw on a series of well-known references within the history of Western 
thought. I will first explore this valuation in relation to Hellenistic philosophy to 
identify key elements by which this valuation has been articulated. I will then 
analyze its repositioning within an “externalist ontology” I associate with the 
Christian doctrine of Creation. Finally, I will draw a relation between this 
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2 The term “web of life” is borrowed from Frtjof Capra (1996). Capra defines “web of life” as 
follow: “The view of living systems as networks provides a novel perspective on the so-called 
hierarchies of nature. Since living systems at all levels are networks, we must visualize the 
web of life as living systems (networks) interacting in network fashion with other systems 
(networks)” (Capra 1996, p. 35). The web of life consists of networks within networks without 
the need of any hierarchical pre-arrangement. The web of life would rather consist in 
intrinsic, dynamic, living mutually reinforcing and co-dependent relations. According to 
Capra, “the essential properties of an organism, or living system, are properties of the whole, 
which none of the part have. They arise from the interactions and relationships among the 
parts ” (Capra 1996, p. 29. The emphasis is mine).
 
repositioning and the emergence of what I call an “epistemology of distrust,” 
facilitating the rise of new criteria of cognitive success discarding ontological 
or metaphysical objects (such as Nature). I will make the argument that this 
paradigm contributes to the difficulty of either thinking Nature through an 
empirical reductionism or an acute form of conceptual solipsism, both 
detrimental to the project of broadening our consciousness from a deeper 
ecological standpoint. This will lead me to suggest a relational ontology that 
may provide an alternative language to formulate an expression of Nature 
that can better resonate with our ecological findings in terms of ontological 
interdependency and interrelatedness, avoid the peril of both essentialism, 
reductionism and solipsism when it comes to thinking Nature, while 
deepening our attachment toward what David Abram calls the “more-than-
human field” (2010). 
An Ontological Itinerary: From Integrative to Externalist Ontology
When discussing our understandings of Nature, going back to the 
Greeks seems unavoidable. Our understandings of Nature have been 
profoundly influenced by the ontological language and epistemological 
distinctions elaborated by Greek thinkers, at the heart of which we find the 
ontological valuation of what-stands-on-its-own. Greek thinkers have been 
credited for a series of distinctions between what is natural (self-occurring 
beings) and what is conventional or crafted, revealing the importance of the 
criterion of what stands-on-its-own (or self-caused) as a prime ontological 
marker (Soper 1995: 37). In fact, nothing short from the “discovery” of Nature
—if by “Nature” we understand an organized physical system governed by 
immanent laws—has been attributed to the Presocratics by famous historian 
of Western philosophy Frederic Copleston (1993: vol. 3, 406). Here again, we 
can see that the importance of the valuation of what-stands-on-its-own plays 
a crucial role in the formulation of natural laws conceived in an eternal, 
universal and apodictic fashion. Most Presocratics were indeed convinced of 
the reign of laws in the universe. Coextensive with human rationality  and the 
structure of the cosmos, they  largely assumed that these laws could be 
deduced by reason (Logos). More precisely, most Presocratics believed in a 
law-governed universe that is neither the plaything of mere caprices of the 
Gods, nor the result of lawless spontaneity (except perhaps Democritus on 
some accounts), which would make any rational attempt to account for the 
causes and principles of the universe useless. 
Matching this ontology, we find a primarily corresponding deductive 
epistemology associated with the use of reason, believed to grant an 
unmediated access to these eternal, incorruptible and self-standing laws and 
principles. For the Presocratics, this epistemological model informs not only 
their quest to explain the origin of the cosmos in universalistic, often non-
mythological and materialistic terms, but also their endeavors to find 
solutions that are eternally true, capable of transcending the realm of mere 
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opinions and contingencies (Copleston 1993: vol. 1, 13-21). Drawn to 
discover “the ultimate substratum of things, the principle that is neither 
generated nor destroyed, but from which particular objects arise and into 
which they pass away” (Copleston 1993: vol. 1, 289), the Presocratics have 
contributed to shape not only an hierarchical divide between what is eternal/
universal and what is merely  contingent/particular, but also the valuation of 
what-stands-on-its-own as a clear sign of superiority over its contrary. 
The epistemic criteria elaborated by the Presocratics surely influenced 
the Ptolemaic vision of a self-standing cosmological order, hierarchically 
divided between a sublunary world and supra-lunary world each having their 
respective laws, assumed to preside over the various sources of 
contingencies plaguing the sublunary  world affected by corruption, 
degeneracy and the need of generation (Koyré 1968: 20). It also contributed 
to shape our formulations of the question of “what is being?” (arguably  the 
foundational question of ontology), influencing the epistemic views of many 
philosophers including perennial figures such as Plato and Aristotle. Both 
these philosophers shared indeed the Presocratic ambition to acquire a 
universalistic knowledge about the first principles of Being and the ontological 
assumption of contiguity  between the structure of the Cosmos and our 
apprehension of these structures through Logos (Copleston 1993: tome 1, 
287). Plato and Aristotle were similarly driven by a search for what stands in 
the nature of a being in spite of the accidents that cannot be deduced or 
defined aprioristically  or universally, thus endorsing the valuation of what-
stands-on-its-own at the level of in their methodology. At the difference of 
their predecessors, however, Plato came to formulate a dualistic theory 
resting on a much more contrasted distinction between the supra-sensible 
(attainable by Reason) and the sensible (viewed as the inferior realm) as 
attested by his doctrine of Forms3; while Aristotle attempted to explain the 
movement whereby object are generated and destroyed rather than the 
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3 Plato’s Forms are described as the causes and the essences of things we find in the world, 
crafted originally by the Demiurge (the efficient cause), and driven to imitate the Good (the 
final cause), namely the eternally self-subsistent and monoeidic Form. Meeting half way the 
position of Heraclitus (that sensible things are always in a state of flux), Plato accepts the 
idea of a true Being, but not in the static terms of Parmenides equating the universe with the 
static One (Copleston 1993, vol. 1, p. 201). For Plato, the One transcends the world. 
Becoming is therefore not denied, but it is believed by Plato to be a lesser condition affecting 
the world situated below the eternal and self-sustaining Forms.
ultimate substratum of everything there is.4  Because Aristotle assumed that 
what is eternal, unchangeable and self-generated is superior to its contrary 
(as most Presocratics did), and because he also assumed that it is 
impossible to have an infinite series of existent sources of movement, 
Aristotle came to the conclusion that the principle which explains the origin of 
all movements can only be found in the existence of an unchangeable being, 
fully actual, pure act and pure thought, cause of motion while itself not 
moved, acting as the final cause of everything: the First Unmoved Mover.5 
My goal here is neither to describe the Presocratics philosophies in a 
comprehensive fashion, nor to expound the work Plato or Aristotle in all due 
details and subtleties. My goal is rather to show the contour of a recurring 
and determinant theme we can see in Hellenistic philosophy: the valuation of 
what-stands-on-its-own. To be sure, Hellenistic philosophy cannot be 
reduced to the philosophy of the Presocratics, Plato or Aristotle. Although it 
can be argued that these thinkers became some of its preeminent voices, I 
realize that there is obviously more and better to say about all the topics I 
have touched upon so far. But perhaps enough has been said to concede the 
point that despite their obvious differences, both Plato and Aristotle shared 
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4 At the risk of oversimplification, we can divide Aristotle’s account of movement in two broad 
categories: movements which are attributable to an external cause (push or pull), and 
movements which are generated by an intrinsic principle initiated by the very nature of the 
body in question (toward the goal of bringing it back to its “natural state” through generation). 
For Aristotle, movement is described as a qualitative process or a state of actualization in a 
universe divided between a sub and superlunary world in which everything tends to go 
toward its “natural location” (Koyré 1968, p. 26). The superlunary world would be inhabited 
by heavenly bodies made of aether that cannot experience any change, other than circular 
and eternal movement; while the Earth, also spherical in shape, would rest at the center of 
the universe, which is organized according to an hierarchical principle putting the inorganic 
matter at the bottom, then the plants, then the animals, then rational humans (whose active 
component—the Nous—pre-exists the body and is eternal).
5 Dissatisfied with his teacher’s theory of imitation, Aristotle is also famous for his suggestion 
that only the individual could be predicated with existence (not its “Form”). In short, Aristotle 
posited that the individual contain the universal qualities observed by Plato, not from a 
transcendental standpoint however, but from an immanent one (i.e. concrete 
universalAristotle was critical of Plato’s theory of Forms (Copleston 1993, vol.1, p. 292). For 
Aristotle, Plato’s theory of Forms offers a poor explanation of the principle of change upon 
which depended the investigation of Nature. Plato’s theory was accused of being merely a 
doubling of the visible things posing problem in the first place. Multiplying existing entities did 
not provide, in Aristotle’s opinion, an answer to the question of why there are multiple things 
to begin with. Furthermore, Plato’s theory of Forms was accused of teaching us nothing of 
the things we find in the world, for they are not even of the same substance whose 
transformation is precisely what we must explain. It neither answers the question if objects 
may exist apart from sensible things while containing their very essences; nor does it explain 
the movement of all things, and why they are passing away.
with the Presocratics the ontological valuation esteeming that what is 
independent, self-generated and incorruptible is superior to its contrary. This 
valuation can be seen at the heart of most the Presocratic ontological 
investigations, which singularly  assume that only  one element constitutes an 
answer to their respective ontological interrogation (water, air, fire, infinity, 
atoms). I use the word “singularly” because I consider that engaging Nature 
in order to search for the most fundamental, universal and irreducible of its 
elements is a peculiar enterprise surely not common to all human cultures. 
The endeavor to formulate answers in terms of oneness and 
universality is in fact both peculiar and promised to a very influential future 
within the development of what we can tentatively  call the Western culture, 
as I hope to illustrate in the following pages. In particular, it can be suggested 
that the ontological quests of the Presocratic have contributed to shape the 
important valuation for what stands without dependency or anterior 
causation. The epistemic implications derived from this ontological valuation 
can be delineated as follow: without anterior causation, the most fundamental 
element of all ought to be posited eternal or without an external causation 
(which, otherwise, would negate its state of ontological primacy). In short, this 
element ought to stand on its own. It also ought to be universal and apodictic, 
as it constitutes the baseline of all others (that is necessarily, and not 
accidentally). As we can see, the ontological assumptions held by the 
Presocratics are intermingled with their epistemological criteria. Searching for 
what is the most primordial element already presupposes the valuation of the 
notion of universality, as the primacy of its Alpha purchase must be true in all 
cases. Their investigations also presuppose the valuation of the notion of 
apodicticity because the Alpha purchase must be necessarily true, and not 
contingent on other factors that would dislodge its primacy. The also assume 
the ontological existence of autonomous (as in separate) substance(s) that 
can be minimally  distinguished from one another. Hence, in order to posit a 
first principle or fundamental substance, they must assume that reality works 
in terms of isolation by which the Arche (or Alpha purchase) can be 
distinguished from what is merely derived. In other words, they must assume 
the principle of non-contradiction between what they assert as the most 
primordial element or substratum, and the rest of them within what 
constitutes a top-down hierarchical understanding of reality. 
By organizing their ontological inquiries as such, the Presocratics have 
contributed to shape an epistemic regime valuing as more “true” and “real” 
what stands beyond contingencies, opinions or conventions. Now the same 
epistemic regime can be found informing Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy, 
which, in turn, have influenced both the Medieval and Modern thinkers who, 
while sometimes disagreeing with their answers or accents (often by 
opposing one to the other), have rarely challenged the deep-seated 
epistemic assumptions and ontological valuations shared by both 
philosophers. Among these assumptions, we can see for instance that both 
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Plato and Aristotle are acknowledging universality and apodicticity  as 
necessary conditions for the formulation of truth. They also share an 
understanding of the world is which essence/identity/entity  are posited as 
existing in an isolated fashion or as or independent realities (from which their 
relations are then derived); a necessary distinction for Plato to posit the 
existence of independent Forms paralleling the lower reality, as well as for 
Aristotle’s teleological and causal theory, which, to explain external causation 
must first assume the isolation of at least two beings then entering in relation, 
or, in the case of natural beings, the self-enclosing limit which Aristotle 
describes in terms of a principle of inner causation toward their actualization.6 
One of the main implications I derived from this epistemic regime is its 
facilitation of a worldview in which dependency or interdependency is viewed 
as lower forms of ontological expression. As we have seen, the search for an 
Alpha purchase explaining the possibility (or the functioning) of Nature is 
framed by a valuation of what ultimately stands ultimately  “free” from anterior 
causation. This is not to say that the Presocratics, Plato or Aristotle had no 
notion or appreciation for the notion of interrelatedness or dependency, but 
rather that their understanding of such notions is always framed by 
hierarchical settings, valuing ultimately  what stand autonomously or beyond 
the effect of change and corruption as being superior. It is this need for a 
hierarchical setting based on the valuation of what-stands-on-its-own that 
initially raises my curiosity. The philosophies of Plato and Aristotle both 
exemplify  the ways in which this ontological valuation can be construed to 
inform an epistemic trajectory  explaining the world or Nature either by a 
paralleled reality endowed with objective qualities hidden to the non-initiate 
(Plato), or by framing our understanding of causation in a hierarchical 
manner going back a first cause or big bang itself paradoxically uncaused; 
two tendencies, as we shall see, that have significantly shaped not only the 
Western ways of comprehending Nature and reality. 
An interesting question then becomes: why did so many Greek 
thinkers came to value what-stands-on-its-own to begin with? And why  do 
we? It is indeed fascinating to observe to what extent our understandings of 
Nature and/or Reality  is still shaped by a quest to locate what comes first, 
within what is often understood as a great hierarchical chain of beings, or 
even within theoretical debates between the primacy of agents or structure to 
account for the possibility of social transformations in domain such as the 
study of International relations. We can also notice our own hierarchical 
tendencies expressed in our beliefs that humans are the bearers of some 
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6 This is not to say that more organic, earth-centered or animist traditions were not present at 
the same time, and sometimes even entangled with these valuations, but that the pervading 
influences of these ontological valuations on the shaping of western thought and the inherent 
preference accorded to what is deemed to stand-on-its-own justify that we take their content 
more seriously.
rational, cultural, symbolic, moral and spiritual capacities we deny to other 
living beings, making us “properly” and often “superiorly” human. Of course, 
the human usage of reason and the emergence of the Polis, to take only two 
famous examples, occur “by nature” according to Aristotle (the main idea 
here would be that we are what our intrinsic nature has indented for us to be 
when we fully  actualize our potential). Hence, we do not need to stand 
“outside” Nature to posit some kind of human superiority  or to endorse 
different forms of anthropocentric reasoning: this can perfectly  happen within 
what call an “integrative ontology.” Human superiority  is indeed justified by 
Aristotle because we would be in a privileged position within the layered 
distribution of what is held as the highest ontological attributes highlighted by 
the criterion of what-stands-on-its-own—in this case our access to a Logos 
believed to partake to a reality made of self-standing principles and concepts 
existing beyond the realm of mere contingencies, dependencies and 
corruptibility affecting the sublunary world. To put it in contrast terms, our 
access to Logos, rational contemplation, morality  and the capacity to live 
collectively according to self-given laws are estimated as what make us 
specifically human and superior to other animals and plants for Greek 
thinkers such as Aristotle and Plato, and not because we would be 
essentially or irreducibly  “free” from the deterministic or teleological aspects 
of natural laws as human beings. To better understand how we came to view 
ourselves as fundamentally distinct from what has been understood as a 
fundamentally  deterministic understanding of Nature, or at least the bearers 
of what can be described as an irreconcilable tension between our humanity 
and Nature, I believe we need to explore some of the consequences of what I 
describe as a shift from an integrative ontology to an externalist ontology 
facilitated by the rise of the Christian doctrine of Creation. 
Nature as Created: The Rise of Externalist Ontology
Let me first attempt to clarify what I mean by an integrative versus an 
externalist ontology. By “integrative” I mean an understanding of reality in 
which the first ontological principle(s) is not posited as being exterior to 
Nature itself. As an example of an integrative ontology, we know that Nature 
is perceived as having no beginning or end for most Greeks cosmologists: 
Nature is viewed as eternal. It is sometimes explained by acts of union 
between primordial forces deemed to have existed forever, and sometimes 
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described as regenerating along cyclical patterns that keep  circling back.7 
Whenever a demiurge is evoked, as in Plato’s Timaeus for instance, divine’s 
interventionism is described as shaping a preexisting “matter.” In other 
words, although Nature is sometimes described as a craftsman by a number 
of Greek thinkers, the Greek Gods are not viewed as the creators of Nature 
ex nihilo.8  Aristotle’s First Immovable Mover, to take a notorious example, is 
not to be conflated with the Creator-God outside Nature we find in 
monotheistic religions. In Aristotle’s cosmology, the First Immovable Mover 
forms the world from within (as its ultimate telos); it does not create the world, 
which, for Aristotle, exists from all eternity. On the epistemological level, the 
assumption that Nature is eternal played a fundamental role: because it was 
assumed that was eternal, Greek thinkers and mathematicians (among them 
Pythagoras, Euclid and Plato) believed that they could rationally deduce 
knowledge and theorems of the same quality, namely theorems or reasons 
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7 My analysis is indebted to the work of Michael B. Foster who have explored the ontological 
differences between Ancient, Christian and Modern worldviews. The theologian M.B. Foster 
contrasted the cosmological beliefs of Christian theology with Greek cosmology in a series of 
articles published in the 1930s (Foster 1934; 1935; 1936). His goal was to demonstrate the 
filiations between the rise of modern sciences and Christian theology. Foster explored the 
cosmological underpinning of modern sciences, especially in regard to the empirical 
methodology allegedly made possible by a cosmology of Creation. See the work of C. 
Wybrow (1992) Creation, Nature, and political order in the philosophy of Michael foster 
(1903-1959): The classic mind articles and others, with modern critical essays. Lewiston 
[NY], Queenstown [ON]: E. Mellen Press.
 
8 As Friedrich Solmsen put it: “The early Greek cosmogonies know nothing of a god who 
‘created Heaven and Earth’ or who ‘separated light from darkness.’ In Hesiod's epic on the 
origin of the gods, the Theogony, Earth, Heaven, Light, and Darkness are among the first 
entities that come into being but they are not in anyway fashioned or created” (Solmsen 
1963).
that were necessary, aprioristic and forever true.9 To strive for true knowledge 
was therefore to search for what was necessarily true, eternal and a priori 
(i.e. beyond the realm of our mere opinions or subjective observations).10 
Breaking away from the cosmological conception that placed humans 
and gods “inside” Nature, the rise of monotheistic religions transformed the 
relationship  between humans and Nature through the notion of an origin and 
personal God transcending Nature. Contrary to the assumption we find in 
many Greek cosmologies, the Christian doctrine of Creation posits that 
Nature has been created ex nihilo by the will of God (Foster 1934, p. 448). 
Therefore, Nature cannot be eternal from a Christian cosmological 
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9 We should be careful here not to suggest any unequivocal correspondence between so-
called “Greek rationalism” and its modern counterpart as if we they were identical things. We 
know, for example, that modern rationalism has been deeply influenced by the emergence of 
monotheism and the inputs of Revelation. Foster brilliantly illustrates how the modern 
philosophers who celebrated the autonomy of a rationality finally emancipated from the 
authority of faith through notions such as “common sense” (Descartes) and the “natural 
lights” (Locke) were in fact experiencing an “internal revelation of what had previously been 
revealed externally to faith.” [...] Neither rationalist nor Empiricist philosophy was really based 
upon the evidence upon which it pretended to rely. No experience, to take one example, 
could serve as evidence to Locke of the existence of material substances, nor any reasoning 
demonstrate to Descartes the existence of a material world. No doubt, the assurance of  
‘common sense’ might suffice for the one, and  ‘natural light’ for the other. But then it must be 
admitted that  ‘common sense’ is something other than sensation and  ‘natural light’ 
something other than reason; and the way is open to enquiry: what is the source of that 
certainty which is derived neither from reason nor from the sense?” The dogmatic heritage of 
Revelation in the form of “internal revelation” (i.e. the positing of a self-evident basis for our 
knowledge) which allowed Modern thinkers to bypass the peril of skepticism is Foster’s 
answer to this question; a form of hidden dogmatism Foster claims was discovered by Kant, 
who perceived quite clearly that the whole of the ontological doctrines of modern Rationalism 
were covertly dependent upon the authority of Revelation (which allowed Kant to dismiss 
them all on such ground). But, as Foster argues, by this time the dogmatic philosophy had 
done their work: a body of sciences had arisen upon the unquestioned presumptions that the 
Rationalist and Empiricist philosophers had laid down (Foster 1934, pp. 450-452).
 
10 This is not to suggest that all the so-called “Greeks” were necessarily thinking along these 
lines, or even in an identical fashion. But while Hesiod and other orphic poets were busy 
tracking the cosmological origins of the Universe in the various mythical successions, 
another tradition of thought that progressively imposed itself as one of the most important 
foundations of our understanding of the world was essentially looking for what remains 
unchanged in the flux and succession of events. That tension between at least two traditions 
of thought illuminates a crucial aspect of our inherited scientific ethos: historical and mythical 
narratives were often disregarded by truth-seeker philosophers—among them Plato—for 
whom such narratives were often incapable of being sure either of our distant origins (hence 
the recourse to myths) or of the future attached to temporal succession, conceived either in 
linear or cyclical fashion. Hence they were regarded as lower forms of knowledge compare 
to modes of knowledge capable of deducing aprioristic and necessary truths, like geometry.
standpoint: it ought to linearly start at one point and end one day. Because 
God is posited as the only  eternal and necessary  being, everything else 
beside God must be finite, contingent and corruptible. The theological 
explanation behind this is simple: no principle or being may equate God in 
His perfection. In other words, the whole of Nature must become a finite, 
contingent, historical and corruptible reality. Nature is viewed as a perishable 
entity  created by the voluntary activity  of its Creator, “created” by what the 
Greek epistemology  discussed earlier holds as a “contingent principle” 
believed to exceed determination by reason: the will of God. In short, the 
rationale explaining why the world has been created is now believed to 
exceed human rational capacity; a human rationality contrasted with the 
omnipotence and eternity of God’s attributes assuring the continuity  and 
cognoscibility of Nature as its Origin and Redeemer.11 
With this shift came of course the delicate task of formulating 
ontological doctrines without the Pagan assurance of the contiguity  between 
reality (or Nature) and the Greek Logos.12 The pagan notion that matter was 
eternal and not created (contradicting the central tenet of monotheistic 
cosmologies), the Greek notion of a Logos rising above contingencies 
(contradicting the dogma of divine providence), and the belief that only  the 
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11 The theological rationale given by the Scriptures (Gen, 3, 4) can be formulated as follow: 
(1) if God created the human will and reason following His own image, which, logically, must 
be nevertheless distinguishable from His in order to stand apart from Him; (2) then God 
necessarily created a reason that was not perfect by virtue of its mere resemblance—not 
identity—to God. (3) The consequence of which is: human reason was logically destined to 
fail. But God cannot be the instigator of such evil contradiction by virtue of His own perfection 
and goodness. Therefore, the Fall of humankind is attributed to an act of free will (the 
disobedience of Adam), much like the possibility of its redemption is attributed to an act of 
free will from God, out of a love that defies reason alone (for no one can be brought to 
perfection and still stand apart from God). Will is therefore the ultimate mechanism used by 
Christian theology to explain both the Fall and Redemption of humankind. An act of will has 
made Adam fallen from paradise, and an act of will alone (not reasoning) can allegedly save 
his descendants by embracing the doctrine of Christian fate.
12 The problem of universals is a telling example of the problems occasioned by attempts to 
harmonize the philosophical heritage of the Ancients with monotheistic dogmas. We find 
medieval scholars arguing that universals must either have a concrete existence or be the 
outcome of attributing nominally a similar quality to different existing beings: a position which 
assumed by extension that only individual entities could be predicated with existence (i.e. 
Roselin, Abelard and Aquinas). The implications of this problem may seem trivial to us, but 
this problem was threatening to many of the dogmas of monotheistic religion. To take only 
one obvious example, original sin was believed to be transmitted via the fault of Adam to all 
humankind, which seems at odds with individuality of existence that follows from the doctrine 
of Aristotle. Refusing this implication, however, led to the equally unacceptable alternative 
that God was responsible for infecting every new born child with this sin when created ex 
nihilo (Copleston 1993, vol. 2, p. 141).
rational part of the soul was eternal (contradicting the conception of personal 
and physical resurrection, and the supremacy of dogmatic faith) were all 
sensitive topics that had to be reconstructed to accommodate monotheistic 
theologies. As the writings of early Christian thinkers from Clement of 
Alexandria to Augustine confirm, it is in fact because the Christian doctrine of 
Creation assimilated much of the Greek ontological premises and valuations 
that the shift to a creationist cosmology called for the major restructuration of 
its epistemology (Baird 1973). 
Among the restructuration, Michael B. Foster agues that the Christian 
doctrine of Creation contributed to overturn the foundations of Greek 
epistemology by  sanctioning the authority of reveled knowledge and the use 
of inductive reasoning based on the use of our sense data (Foster 1934). The 
authority conferred to Revelation is here supported by a straightforward 
theological argument: the belief that human reason alone cannot possibly 
know the reason why and how God created the world. Faith in the knowledge 
handed by God is thus posited as superior to the use of rationality alone. 
Because reason is perceived limited, fallible and incapable of owning 
cognitively God’s plans, inductive reasoning based on the use of our sense 
data becomes the best alternative for what was left unspecified by God’s 
Revelation.13 In short, the confidence the Greeks had in our rational abilities 
to deduce aprioristic and eternal truth is basically  shattered by the ontological 
implications of Christian cosmology positing that the whole of Creation 
depends on a contingent principle that the Greek logos cannot foreseen or 
own, namely God’s free and unpredictable will. According to Foster, it is the 
valorization of the inductive use of our sense data based on a fallibilist 
understanding of human rationality that has paved the way for the 
emergence of inductive rationality based on sensuous experiences and 
verification by empirical experiment (Foster 1934). This valorization, in turn, 
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13 This theological justification will later be challenged most famously by Descartes who 
challenge the reliability of our sense data in his Metaphysical Meditations, locating instead 
the ontological anchor of our knowledge in the subjective existence of a thinking substance, 
that while doubting of everything, cannot doubt that it is thinking (Meditations IX, 13). But 
even if Descartes was able to restore our confidence in our capacity to attain an undeniable 
and necessary truth by the power of our reason alone (the Cogito), his call for the adoption 
of a method for “thinking clearly” indicates de facto his commitment to a faillibilist 
understanding of human rationality (if left unchecked), a commitment we also find at the 
heart of the Christian doctrine of Creation.
    
would have facilitated the emergence of the foundational paradigm of modern 
sciences.14 
Far from opposing modern sciences and Christian theology, Foster 
thus establishes a direct connection between the theological assumptions 
emerging with the Christian doctrine of Creation positing the idea that Nature 
is created, and the epistemic framework adopted by modern sciences. 
Foster’s analysis shows not only how important our ontological assumptions 
about Nature are, but he also unveils significant epistemological implications 
resulting from what appears to be a small shift from “Nature as eternal” to 
“Nature as created.” I am of course not the first interested by the epistemic 
and ecological implications associated with the emergence of Christianity. 
That Christianity  contributed to the cultivation of dominative attitudes toward 
Nature is a point that has been already argued most famously by  Lynn White 
Jr., who suggested that Christianity has generated the horizon of a dualism 
(Nature opposed to God) and an anthropocentric conception when it comes 
to our relationships toward non-human beings, paving the way to destructive, 
chauvinistic and selfish attitudes toward Nature (White 1967).15  Christianity 
has been also imparted with the creation of a powerful narrative portraying an 
idyllic picture of Nature (i.e. the Garden of Eden) provoking nostalgic needs 
and redemptory attempts to domesticate Nature in a similar fashion with the 
result of destroying the integrity of existing “untamed” ecosystems and 
wildlife (Merchant 2003). Adding to the corpus of critiques already formulated, 
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14 As Foster put it: [...] the contingent is knowable only by sensuous experience. If, therefore, 
the contingent is essential to Nature, experience must be indispensable to the science of 
Nature; and not indispensable merely as a stage through which the human scientist must 
pass on his way to attaining knowledge by reason, but indispensable because knowledge by 
reason cannot be adequate to a Nature which is essentially something more than an 
embodiment of the form [Foster refers here to the Greek cosmological notion of form versus 
matter]. This “something more,” the element in Nature which depends upon the voluntary 
activity of God, is incapable of becoming an object to reason alone, and science therefore 
must depend, in regard to this element, upon the evidence of sensation [...] and the 
conclusion follows that only a created Nature is proper object of an empirical science. 
(Foster 1934, p. 465. The emphasis is mine)
15 To be fair, it is true that a number of apologists of Judaism, Christianity and Islam have 
defended the intrinsic value of Nature, while advocating for stronger environmental ethics or 
measures. It should however be add that such defense of Nature has always been under the 
assumption that Nature has an intrinsic value (here independent of human valuation or 
needs) precisely because created by God. It is because God is the Alpha point of their 
ontological valuation that apologists of monotheistic religions assert that Nature possesses 
an intrinsic value beyond human needs, and not, contrary to my own position, because 
Nature has an intrinsic and immanent value without the need to assert any higher or external 
principle to justify its worth (which does not necessarily mean that I hold that Nature’s 
intrinsic value can be posited independently from our human valuations).
Foster’s analysis helps us to illustrate more clearly that the Christian doctrine 
of Creation assimilated not only  an ontological language subordinating 
notions such as interdependency, contingency and corruptibility to their 
contraries, but took the extra step of placing the origin of the highest 
ontological qualities in a divinity outside Nature. This move, I suggest, 
basically shifted the course of our thinking from an integrative to an 
externalist ontological standpoint, generating significant consequences on 
the ways in which we understand both Nature and knowledge.
Among these consequences, we can notice the change of location, so 
to speak, of the valuation of what-stands-on-its-own. By being associated 
with God-creator, this valuation no longer serves as this ontological criterion 
by which levels of being are distributed within a hierarchical ontology (as 
within Greek cosmologies), it now informs a radical differentiation between 
two ontological orders: that is between God and the rest of the world. At a 
fundamental level, it is now the will of God versus the rest of His Creation. 
What-stands-on-its-own is ultimately posited as an external element of 
Nature that now stands in a deterministic relation to God’s will—with the 
noticeable exception of Mankind’s divine gift of freewill by  which the 
introduction of evil is explained. Most importantly, Nature is stripped of its 
self-causing properties, agency and immanent teleology. All these are now 
attributed ultimately  to God. The epistemological consequences of this shift 
are significant: as Foster convincingly  demonstrates, the Christian doctrine of 
Creation has generated a theory of knowledge limiting the scope of human 
rationality by positing an understanding of truth that can never be assured of 
its findings on a rational basis alone (hence the need for empirical 
verifications). An alleged “finite mind” cannot possibly deduce the universal 
and aprioristic truths that would dictate or precede God’s will in virtue of their 
eternal nature: this would amount to hubris for the Christian mind. 
Following Foster’s argument, we are invited to draw interesting 
parallels between Christianity  and modern science in its positivistic/empirical 
acceptance. To begin with, just like the ultimate causes explaining why the 
world exists are put beyond the reach of human rationality by Christianity, the 
empirical and inductive reasoning that inform the modern scientific method 
forbid its user to posit the existence of an irrefutable/eternal truth. Scientific 
researchers do posit the existence of truth. But while doing so, they ought to 
assume that it is always possible that new findings or the discovery of a 
mistake may refute what was once assumed irrefutable. Both Christianity and 
the practice of modern science thus assume the fallibility  of the human mind, 
hence the need to recourse either to the authority of faith or to an accepted 
method of verification to check a rationality no longer trusted in its ability  to 
grasp the truth on its own. More specifically, what the modern scientific 
method has inherited from Christian theology  is basically  the legitimation of a 
mode of knowledge that Greek epistemology couldn’t accept on the basis of 
its ontological commitments and its valuation of what truth ought to be 
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(aprioristic, necessary, universal, and more importantly  based on deductive 
reasoning). In other words, it appears that the modern spirit has assimilated 
the element of skepticism posited by the Christian doctrine of Creation, 
reframed by the scientific mind in the assertion that our representations of 
reality and reality  itself can never perfectly coincide. This metaphysical and 
theological background, I suggest, has facilitated to the emergence of what I 
call an “epistemology of distrust” positing that human rationality needs extra 
sources of verification in its pursuit of truth (historical evidences, empirical 
verifications, and so on).16 Let us now explore some of the repercussions that 
this “epistemology of distrust” have had on the emergence of a new paradigm 
of knowing informing a revolutionary understanding of science or episteme.  
From Ontology to Functionalist Methodology
One of the main repercussions emerging with the ontological and 
metaphysical implications associated with the Christian creationism has been 
the challenge offered by logical and empirical research—ironically 
restructured around the failibilist implications of the Christian doctrine—
against the authority  of theological doctrines. The effect of this reversal can 
be observed in the progressive separation between philosophy and theology 
mediated by the greater importance attributed to the logical treatment of 
theological arguments viewed as capable of being studied independently 
(Copleston 1993, vol. 3, p. 419). This separation facilitated, in turn, the rise of 
the “nominalist spirit” and renewed forms of skepticism, best expressed by 
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16 This is not to suggest that Skepticism is a new phenomenon introduced only with the 
Christian doctrine of Creation. Skepticism has indeed a long philosophical tradition, 
stretching from Protagoras, Sextus Empiricus, to modern thinkers such as David Hume. One 
of the main differences, I suggest, between pre- and post-doctrine of Creation skepticism 
amounts to the fact that while ancient Skepticism often opposes the hypothetico-deductive 
possibility of knowledge, making the world and its objects fundamentally unknowable, the 
“epistemology of distrust” I suggest holds that it is still possible to know the word and its 
objects providing (initially) faith in God and the right method of investigation. It confirms our 
sense data and inductive reasoning on the basis of theological implications as a way to 
confirm hypothetico-deductive knowledge (viewed as unreliable on its own). Put otherwise, it 
doesn’t use inductive reasoning to advocate the skeptical thesis that knowing this world is 
impossible. My larger point in this article is that the power given to the scientific method of 
investigation eventually outruns its speculative or metaphysical dimension by adopting a 
series of cognitive criteria that favors pragmatic ideas such as “what is true is what works,” 
and others pragmatic and instrumentalist perspectives that gradually discard the need to 
pursue metaphysical speculation to guarantee the “progress” of science. While it is certainly 
true that metaphysical speculation and concepts still occupy an important role in scientific 
research, I argue that the cognitive criteria of success implied by the scientific method of 
verification are now shaping a mode of knowledge in which epistemology outpaces open 
metaphysical inquiries by requiring that metaphysical speculation—in fact any valid scientific 
discovery—be ultimately amenable to the criteria making their empirical verifications possible 
(isolation, falsification, predictability, subject of repeatable experiences, and so on).     
 
the influential work of Montaigne who questioned the usefulness of 
metaphysics on the basis of our rational incapacities to achieve certainty 
(1533-92).17  While not plainly abandoned, metaphysics tended to move 
toward the exploration of logical analysis, bringing an increasing distance 
between rational and theological argumentation while isolating logical from 
ontological argument, with the consequence of relegating the question of 
God’s existence to one’s faith alone. God being held as the ultimate 
ontological guarantor that Nature exists objectively, the logical refutation of 
theological arguments contributed to shake, and eventually sever, the ties we 
had with an external reality we cannot trust anymore except on the account 
of dogmatic faith. It can thus be suggested that the first wall of Western 
solipsism I wish to problematize was erected through the emergence of an 
“epistemology of distrust” initially supported by a revolution of theological 
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17 The nominalist spirit, according to Frederick Copleston, is a disposition inclined toward 
“analysis rather than to synthesis, and to criticism rather than to speculation,” with the 
consequence of leaving “faith hanging in the air, without (so far as philosophy is concerned) 
any rational basis” (Copleston 1993, vol. 3, p. 11).
nature, which eventually turned against its own metaphysical and dogmatic 
base.18 
Confronted with renewed and sometimes radical forms of skepticism 
dismissive of metaphysical explanations as a result, a number of thinkers 
strived to articulate new metaphysics and natural philosophies that could 
explain Nature in toto, and/or could grant to human rationality the possibility 
to enounce indubitable truths (Copleston 1993, vol. 4, p. 19).19 In contrast to 
scholastic philosophers who already believed in the existence of self-evident 
principles, the hope this time was for a fresh start under the guidance of the 
The Trumpeter
ISSN: 0832-6193
Volume 28, Number 1 (2012)
Sebastian Malette                                                                                                                                               139
18 Of course, the authority of ecclesiastical powers was also weakened by a series of events 
that had little to do with the inner contradictions resulting from the epistemology endorsed by 
the Christian doctrine of Creation. The translation and diffusion of various texts from Ancient 
mathematicians and physicists, for instance, did expend significantly the knowledge of 
Ancient philosophy beyond Plato and Aristotle medieval commentaries. The Renaissance 
period was then marked by a significant revival of Skepticism (Montaigne), Stoicism (Justus 
Lipsius), and Epicureanism (Gassendi), leading to various conceptions of Nature (Brush 
1966, Saunders 1955, Sarasohm 1996). Involving astronomy, alchemy and astrology, 
provocative works and new cosmologies emerged, such as Giordano Bruno’s idea of a 
divine immanence found in Nature and a pluralist conception of the universe constituted of 
multiple solar systems in a limitless space, or the critique of Aristotle’s account of movement 
by Albert of Saxony, proposing a theory of impetus which foreshadows the 17th century 
mechanistic theories of Nature (Bruno 1998, Zambelli 2007, Beitchman 1998). Helped by the 
invention of printing press, the Renaissance period was marked not only by the diffusion of 
ancient ideas, but also of theological disputes, political ideas and scientific discoveries to a 
wider audience (including women), which, under the form of a book, simultaneously favored 
non-communal forms of communication away from the collective control of thinking, in the 
solitary comfort and relative safety of reading one’s ideas to make a mind of its own (Tarnas 
1991, p. 226). The unitary worldview provided by Christianity under the tutelage of the 
Church came also under stress when a number of its adherents took its narrative 
(increasingly translated and printed in vernaculars) in different directions, using the irrational 
supremacy of faith, the power of divine providence and inspiration, as well as the claim of an 
individualized relationship between the individual and God, to challenge both the authority of 
ecclesiastics and political ruling institutions. The rise of various Christian sects, including the 
Levellers, the Diggers and the Familists, diffused new ideas about Nature seen mostly as 
benevolent, while condemning existing social hierarchies (Merchant 1989). Believing in the 
immanent return of Christ on Earth, these sects often organized themselves in collective 
communities modeled on their visions of what would be life on Earth after the return of Christ 
among us. The fragmentation of a centralized Christian dominion was also speeded up by a 
series of bloody and ruinous religious wars intermingled with political struggles between 
nobility factions, encouraging the development of an international system of sovereign states 
independent—at least technically—from the centralizing govern of the Catholic Church.
19 This renewed Pyrronism mostly attributed to Montaigne’s philosophy asserted that the 
mind is dependent on sense-experience, that sense-experiences are relative and unreliable, 
and that consequently we cannot attain any absolute truth. In short, Montaigne was denying 
the possibility that we could construct any reliable metaphysical system, an argument he 
illustrated by the fact that metaphysicians often arrived at different and incompatible 
conclusions. In sum, the whole project of metaphysics was being discarded.
right method of investigation, informed by the inputs of skepticism combined 
with mathematical reasoning to deduce the necessary truths that would give 
us concrete, applicable and cumulative information about Nature. In other 
words, we started to believe in the inputs of methods held independently from 
the content of the world, gradually shifting the locus of what-stands-on-its 
own from a primarily ontological location (the search for self-standing 
elements in a hierarchical fashion) to a methodological or epistemological 
one (the search for a self-standing method or logic capable of explaining the 
contingencies of the world), as the key for the human mind to get access to 
certainty. 
Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650) are 
perhaps two of the best representatives of these hopes. In his major work 
Novum Organum, Bacon argues that the traditional inquest into the final 
causes (or purposes) of Nature is useless. He furthermore argues that 
Forms, as abstract natural kinds, do not exist. Metaphysics is here reduced 
to the study of the formal causes or the general laws (or principles) by which 
natural events may be understood in a productive manner. In short, Bacon 
denounced metaphysical entities as fictional. Contra Aristotle, Bacon objects 
to the conception of a natural philosophy devoted to understanding things by 
understanding their nature: that is, by privileging the study of the internal 
movements by which a being goes toward its intrinsic finality. On the contrary, 
Bacon holds that it is the “violent movements,” which Aristotle discarded as 
unpredictable accidents, that we should consider. Bacon situates the causes 
of movement at a mechanic and corpuscular level; they are the microscopic 
parts whose distribution and behaviors would explain the macroscopic 
features of bodies, without reference to some Grand and strange First 
Unmoved Mover (Gaukroger 2006, p. 361). In sum, what empower humans 
(according to Bacon) are not sterile discussions about the intrinsic nature of 
things, but the ability to understand the connection between parts and the 
movements they can produce. To the Aristotelian notion of deduction, Bacon 
favors the systematic elimination of non-conclusive experiences in order to 
produce a more robust knowledge of Nature oriented toward concrete control 
over our natural environment (Gaukroger 2006, p. 166). Moving away from 
an understanding of metaphysics as a science of being qua being, 
Descartes’ metaphysical meditations are also concerned by the conditions 
that guide human knowledge toward certainty  and clarity. At the core of 
Descartes’ work we find explicitly the reworking of the valuation of what-
stands-on-its-own within an externalist ontology, starting with (A) the belief 
that God is exterior to its creation, (B) the proposition that philosophy ought 
to start with the meditations of the self-reflecting ego, and (C) the suggestion 
that there are two basic substances with independent existence: mind (the 
essence of which is thought) and matter (as extension considered apart from 
motion, time and energy). It is this ontological reworking that made possible 
Descartes’ dualistic and mechanistic metaphysics, which operates from 
The Trumpeter
ISSN: 0832-6193
Volume 28, Number 1 (2012)
Sebastian Malette                                                                                                                                               140
deductive assumptions based on his definition of matter as extension, and 
movement as local motion. This allows Descartes to produce a powerful 
vision along the formulation of a mechanical theory of everything (including 
the physical portion of living beings), in which the principle of causality is 
understood in mechanical terms. For Descartes, the scholastic notion of final 
cause (which explains for instance that the natural tendency of a stone is to 
fall to the ground for Aristotle) results from attributing a mental or cognitive 
quality  to a physical object. The realm of thought and matter must therefore 
be carefully  distinguished by following the right method, which, for Descartes, 
emphasizes the supremacy of clear, ordered and distinct ideas accessible 
only after exercising a methodological doubt purging prejudices, confusions 
and false opinions.  
Although certainly influential in shaping the modern faith in 
methodological procedures and ways of solving problems, the new 
metaphysic or natural philosophy remained however incapable to meet the 
standards established by new cognitive criteria of success based on 
empirical/mathematical demonstration, cumulative knowledge and the 
concrete mastery of reality, gradually associated with engineering and 
technological powers. It can indeed be argued that Bacon’s theory on the 
“false idols of the mind” did not provide any guarantee for the accumulation of 
concrete knowledge. Bacon’s speculative parallelism between the micro and 
macro that informed his theory of matter cannot be demonstrated from an 
experimental standpoint anymore than Aristotle’s metaphysical system. 
Descartes’ Cogito may have produced a form of certainty on the basis of 
Man’s rational powers alone, but this new insight didn’t support any concrete 
contribution when it comes to mastering reality or Nature. Despite their 
insights into quantifying the micro level or reality, thinkers like Beeckman, 
Hobbes and Descartes were incapable of translating such micro framework 
to macroscopic empirical events: no unified worldview generating concrete 
predictive powers on reality  could be generated (Gaukroger 2006, pp.
397-400). Even Kant’s later attempt to rescue the notion of a priori synthetic 
judgment only fortified the very limit which all future metaphysics could not 
transgress: the limit of experience itself. Despite Kant’s attempt to invert the 
problem of metaphysics by assuming that objects ought to conform to our 
cognition rather than to external reality, Kant was only capable of saving the 
so-called forms or categories of pure experience (space and time) as a priori 
laws governing all objects of experience at the cost of ascribing them solely 
to those objects we can experience. Of course, it can be said that Kant 
rescued the traditional metaphysical division between form and matter (form 
as an a priori feature of experience that our mind imposes on matter through 
cognition), but by themselves, these concepts could not produce any 
cumulative or predictive knowledge about the world amenable to concrete 
manipulation. In sum, it appears that all the modernized metaphysical 
doctrines still suffered from an old problem: they remained highly speculative 
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with no tangible ways to discriminate their content on the basis of concrete or 
positive empirical knowledge that could be translated into cumulative 
technological advancements. As such, metaphysical doctrines appear to be 
poorly  equipped to compete with the emergence of new criteria of cognitive 
success increasingly geared toward scientific advancements, mathematical 
precision and the concrete capacities they could provide to its users. 
Galileo is perhaps the best-known exponent of the new cognitive 
criteria of success based on the use of mathematics and empirical 
demonstrations, geared toward what we can call a functionalist and 
instrumentalist paradigm of knowledge. His research in hydrostatics and 
mechanics and his inventions, which included the thermometer and the 
amelioration of the telescope, contributed not only to the reliability  of the 
experimental method, but, more importantly, to the refutation of the scholastic 
appropriation of Aristotle’s physics by proving via facts and experiment that 
mathematized laws about movement were possible (Koyré 1968, p. 39).20 
Moreover, his discovery of the moons orbiting around Jupiter contradicted 
Aristotle’s theory that all celestial bodies should revolve around the Earth, 
and his observations of the gibbous and full phases of Venus contributed to 
refuting the geocentric Ptolemaic theory endorsed by the Church, confirming 
experimentally  Copernicus’ comprehensive heliocentric cosmology.21 
Galileo’s contribution helps to illustrate the epistemic tendency in which 
metaphysical deductive explanations and cosmological theories have been 
receding in favor of experimental and instrumentalist-based theories 
formulated upon the success of pragmatic discoveries and technological 
inventions. It took in fact the combination of experimental natural philosophy 
and mathematical speculation to overcome the persistent belief that an 
account of Nature needed to investigate the process of change from the 
standpoint of metaphysical or aprioristic categories such as essence, form or 
matter. The strength of this new combination revolved around its capacity to 
trade the ontological question of “what is” for the formulation of mathematized 
and demonstrable laws showing “how does it work.” To bring technologies to 
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20 For Aristotelians, movement was essentially a teleological process linked with a qualitative 
appreciation of the object being moved or at rest (according to their natural tendencies). 
Mathematics was believed not suitable for the study of physics or movement, assumed to be 
of a contingent and accidental Nature irreducible to mathematical demonstrations (which 
could only be applied to the study of heavenly bodies). Galileo’s demonstration that objects 
fall at the same rate whatever their mass refuted such a static conception of order, proving 
by the same token that the body is completely indifferent to being in movement or at rest. 
The movement of a body came to be perceived only in relation to another body perceived as 
still (Koyré 1968, p. 33).
21 On Galileo confirmation of Copernicus’s cosmology, see Morphet, C. 1977. Galileo and 
Copernican astronomy: a scientific world view defined. London: Butterworths.
harness the powers of Nature was the ultimate sign of success of such 
approach. Galileo’s system of dynamics, later completed by Newton in 1687, 
contributed to make such criteria of cognitive success irreversible. Replacing 
the geometrical conception that attempted to explain the movement of 
planets, we were finally  presented with a full dynamics explaining how the 
motion of each body accelerated in toto. Newton’s laws, together with the 
laws of force (such as the inverse square law of gravitation), provided a 
reliable, accurate, unified and useful account—although arguably still 
metaphysical by its central element, i.e. the notion of force—explaining the 
motion of bodies this time both in heavens and on Earth (Penrose 1992, p. 
124).22 
With the penetration of mathematical schemes of thinking and 
scientific rigor in all spheres of our lives, many believed that we could finally 
take our leave from natural theology and abstruse metaphysical speculation. 
But again not everyone agreed on such premise, and certainly not everyone 
were ready to give up on the project of regenerating a natural theology upon 
“scientific” examinations of Nature. What made the renewed attempts at 
natural philosophy so interesting to many thinkers of the 17th and 18th 
centuries, especially in England, were the prospects it presented for the 
renewal of natural theology on the grounds that it could inspire humility and 
awe in the face of the wonders of the Creation (Gaukroger 2006: pp. 23-29, 
Westfall 1992). In other words, the gradual dominance of the modern 
scientific method alone was not a cure to theism, creationist or teleological 
arguments. As Stephan Gaukroger suggests, the conception of a “scientific 
culture” free at last from theological influence, adopting an adversarial 
paradigm only for the sake of the pursuit of truth, and leading humanity 
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22 Of course not everyone rallied in favor of this instrumentalist and reductionist vision of 
Nature, as exemplified by the defenders of naturalism, vitalism and even magical views, who 
merged Nature and conatus by attributing to the natural elements intrinsic powers and 
intelligence. But, as Carolyn Merchant explains, the project of Renaissance magicians to 
gain power over an intelligent and sensitive Nature was swiftly recuperated by the 
mechanistic paradigm of thinking arguing for an understanding of matter as passive, Nature 
as soulless, and movement as resulting from external forces (Merchant 1989, p. 117). The 
mechanist paradigm presented the advantage of being more suitable to the calculating and 
experimenting mind alike, eager to assert that the individualized parts of a fundamentally 
passive matter that could be numbered, added or subtracted, and delimited empirically. This 
powerful representation of Nature as a machine or a clock helped to legitimate mathematical 
and experimental ways of solving problems that could leave behind the various metaphysical 
quarrels about what Nature is (or is not). I do not suggest here that “Scientifics” are no longer 
speculating and event using concepts and ideas that cannot be demonstrated empirically, for 
instance the notion of force or gravitation, but that ontological inquiries of hypothetico-
deductive nature about the status of Nature gradually lost its importance in favor of an ethos 
geared pragmatically to control concretely its surroundings.    
toward technological progress should be greatly  nuanced (2006, 34-39).23 
The mechanical, atomistic or mathematic representation of Nature did neither 
kill the idea that God created Nature, nor the use of metaphysical speculation 
or concepts in science. Robert Boyle was indeed convinced of the dogma of 
divine creation, as were Newton, Descartes, Leibniz and many other 
influential figures associated with the Scientific Revolution. It was in fact often 
believed that God, as Creator of Nature, secured the parallelism between 
mathematical deductions, experiments and the actual system of Nature 
understood mainly in teleological terms. 
Arguably, however, all the concerted efforts to formulate a scientific-
based natural theology and the personal beliefs of early scientists didn’t 
suffice to reroute a paradigm of knowledge increasingly  committed to a 
positivistic and functionalist understanding of Nature in which no-preordained 
destination, normative finality or divine plan are seen as necessary to support 
the coherence and accumulation of progressive knowledge. These criteria 
even came to inform theories of Nature explicitly dismissive of the favorite 
arguments associated with Classic or scholastic metaphysics (i.e. teleological 
reasoning, the presence of an intelligent design, and so on). Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory is a great example of this. His theory provides a 
devastating alternative which basically undermines the need to explain 
organic adaptation and the biological differences observed in Nature from the 
standpoint of a design theory or any other grand teleological explanations 
(although Darwin did not refute theism per se). Darwin achieves this by 
repositioning the concept of teleology in materialistic and predominantly 
individualistic terms (Sober 1992, pp. 98-103). For Darwin, not only the idea 
of teleology is completely refocused, but no overall or pre-existing harmony 
could be deduced from his scientific findings. In Darwin’s view, the human 
species is no longer central to explaining the purposes of Nature; the 
Lamarckian idea of a Nature positioning the human species (and its rational 
attributes) above all other species is completely obsolete for Darwin. Nature 
is no longer conceived as an agent or as an organizing entity greater than its 
parts. Rather the contingent natural processes of selection operate at the 
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23 As Gaukroger indicates, the creation of a “neutral space” of enquiries was not the outcome 
of modern scientific work alone; rather the emergence of such space was also the result of 
external influences, such as Gratian’s codification of the canon law around 1140, which, by 
harmonizing various legal traditions, shaped a new juridical culture that opened a “neutral 
space” for disputation, innovation and argument (Gaukroger 2006, p. 34). By establishing 
corporate bodies on its own model (cities, guilds, universities), the codification of the law 
helped to create a form of decentralization by which autonomous spheres of professional 
and civic activity could boast innovation and free inquiries under a protected aegis. When it 
comes to the question of truth, the motivation behind the emergent scientific ethos was less 
the disinterested pursuit of truth per se, than a pursuit of what is useful and can endow 
human life with new discoveries and power (Gaukroger 2006, p. 39).
 
level of ontologically-isolated individuals in relation to a milieu through time, 
which, by transmitting their adaptive qualities to their immediate descendant, 
shape the outer aspect of species no longer viewed in static and essentialist 
terms.24 Not only is Earth no longer viewed as the center of the universe, and 
the sun no longer the only sun there is, but Nature itself, after Darwin, seems 
indifferent to the place human species occupies in the “tree of Life.” 
From such a resolute “scientific” perspective, it appears that 
ontological and metaphysical speculations are no longer essential to support 
what came to be understood as the pursuit of concrete and cumulative 
knowledge. “Serious” scientific research is reputed to have kicked the 
ontological ladder from under itself a long time ago—at least the hypothetico-
deductive one. When it comes to Nature, the deductive quest to know being 
qua being has been replaced by combinations of empirical and/or 
mathematical enquiries focusing on how the universe behaves the way it 
does, not so much what the universe is in term of essence. New criteria of 
cognitive success have been formulated in accordance with the multiplication 
of “practical spheres” that no transcendent principle or overarching 
authoritative source of evaluation is conceived capable of generating a 
common vision of the world (Angus 1983, p.162). This is not to suggest that 
Scientists no longer speculate and posit metaphysical or ontological theories. 
It can be argued that Scientists still use ontological and metaphysical 
concepts, such as the notion of force or gravitation, which, in and of 
themselves, cannot be empirically verified (only their attributed effects can). 
But it is hardly disputable that metaphysical or ontological theories are now 
subsumed under the authority of the scientific method of verification, which 
cognitive criteria of success are increasingly geared toward instrumental, 
technological and pragmatic measures of efficiency which makes the usage 
of reference to some grand notion of Nature increasingly obsolete. 
After so many blows against the possibility of learning anything new 
from metaphysics or ontology, it is therefore not surprising that questions 
such as “which entities are fundamental?” or “what can be said to exist?” 
have been relegated mostly to the history of philosophy. It is a now widely 
shared assumption that the study of Nature belongs to modern physics or 
evolutionary biology, whose specializations into so many branches makes 
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24 The Aristotelian logic, which sees the individual’s particularities as mere accident of a 
universal and teleological Nature, is here completely turned on its head. After Darwin, the 
individual’s particularities (seen as adaptive markers) are precisely what define a species in 
its dynamic evolution, which is not preset by any finality but rather contingent on what the 
individuals are transmitting to their offspring(s). Even if we suppose that God is the Creator 
of all what Darwin is describing, Darwin’s research made such a hypothesis not only 
unnecessary for conducting his enquiries, but even problematic if we understand that 
struggle and the blind elimination of the weakest elements are the driving forces behind 
natural selection and so-called evolution.
unlikely any grand synthesis or grand normative assessment over the 
question of what Nature is. At this point, we can be tempted to ask the 
question: what can we possibly  means when we evoke Nature? In a setting 
in which the progress and usefulness of knowledge are reflected by their 
technological and effective applications, the answer seems overly blurry and 
of second importance really. Due to its commitment to epistemology  prior to 
ontology, and its dismissive attitude toward the problem of “valuing values,” it 
appears unlikely that what we call “modern sciences” will ever produce a 
unitary and/or universal understanding of Nature. While it is certainly  true that 
modern physics holds that the laws it asserts are universal (although always 
refutable), this is not the same thing than saying that modern physics needs 
an overarching or unitary picture of Nature in order to do so. The fact is that it 
does not. The strength of the modern scientific method lies precisely in its 
rebuttal of any teleological, grand design or unitary vision of Nature that 
would supersede dogmatically open scientific enquiries. In sum, the 
supremacy of the scientific methodology depends less on the production of a 
universal concept of Nature, than on the radical dissolution of all evaluative 
comprehension of Nature with the propagation of an alleged neutral, value-
free and a-cultural method of investigation, itself consolidated with piecemeal 
discoveries committed to an epistemological principle of falsification and 
future amendments. The supremacy of the scientific method (not scientific 
speculation) resides in its capacity  to reroute the criteria of cognitive success 
according to a principle of falsification that allows for the possibility of future 
revisions based on empirical experiments, introducing a level of contingency 
that makes close to impossible the formulation of any comprehensive and 
definitive understanding of what Nature is in toto.
Hence my initial question: what are the consequences of the 
dominance of an epistemic paradigm committed to an instrumental/
methodological understanding of knowledge for the project of formulating an 
ecological wisdom that wishes to take seriously the notion of relationality  and 
co-dependency at a fundamental level? If positivistic “scientific” thinking 
dismisses the objects of holistic or integrative thinking as inadmissible 
metaphysical speculations because not amenable to any empirical criterion 
of verification, on what basis should environmental discourses promote or 
justify  the inference of ontological interrelatedness and interdependency? 
How can we defend the protection, the preservation, the diversity, the 
regeneracy or “chaotic potentiality” of Nature, if the gap  between the various 
empirically  based studies in ecology and the idea of Nature as a whole 
cannot be bridged? 
Discussion: Toward a Relational Ontology
I must admit having no simple answer to these interrogations. In an 
attempt to clarify what I see as a profound difficulty between what gradually 
became a dominant mode of knowing and the need of a wisdom taking into 
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account metaphysical principles (ecological interrelatedness and 
interdependency), I have offered a meditation on the ontological valuation of 
“what-stands-on-its-own” as I was struck by the implications between our 
understandings of Nature (either as eternal or as created) and the different 
epistemic regimes these fundamental assumptions have facilitated. My 
attempt shouldn’t be perceived as an invitation to dismiss the scientific 
method, nor technology, both of which can be extremely helpful in 
demonstrating the ecological impacts of human activities (especially between 
two-isolated phenomena). My questions should rather be seen as probing the 
possibility to articulate a wisdom that may help us to move beyond the 
choices of either siding with an empirical reductionism and verifiabilism, or 
the tendency to fall back on simplistic and possibly totalitarian monistic/
closed/static understandings of Nature. Thinking this possibility  begs the 
question if we should distance ourselves from the attempt to seize the truth of 
Nature according to the problematic assumption that there is something 
independent, invariable, simple, first, pure and independent at the root of the 
phenomenal world that we ought to make explicit, either metaphysically or 
methodologically. From an ecological standpoint, this assumption is clearly 
problematic: everything seems to be interrelated, dependent on numerous 
open sets of relations, interconnected by dynamically evolving loopback 
effects, intrinsically  complex, responsive and diverse. So why do we still 
privilege the isolation of what-stands-on-its-own or what appears to be 
independent to inform the ways in which we attempt to know the world, rather 
than valuing, for instance, the relationships by  which things are allowed to 
emerge, including the truths we formulate about our experience of reality?
Exploring the deeper causes that might help to explain why we came 
to endorse almost unconsciously the valuation of what-stands-on-its-own, I 
have first suggested that this valuation has informed a specific understanding 
of truth, endowed with the character of universalism, apodicticity  and 
apriorism, and a worldview upholding what is autonomous, pure, self-caused 
on so on as superior to its contrary. I have then suggested that this 
ontological valuation played a key role in producing an externalist ontology 
via its association with the will of a monotheistic and creationist God. As a 
result, I have argued that Nature was stripped of its eternal and self-causing 
character. The basis of “what-stands-on-its-own” was relocated within God’s, 
and later Man’s free will: no longer in a Nature viewed mostly as externally 
determined. Following the work of M.B. Foster, I have argued that the 
supremacy of the deductive mode of knowledge that characterized Greek 
epistemology  was overthrown by the introduction of an element of 
irrationalism found in a contingent ontological principle based on theological 
grounds: God’s will. An “epistemology of distrust” emerged as a result, 
favoring the use of inductive reasoning and empiricism until the theological 
skepticism that initially  facilitated their epistemic validation started to 
undermine its own dogmatic base. I have suggested that this “epistemology 
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of distrust” facilitated the rise of new cognitive criteria gradually de-anchored 
from traditional ontology and theological doctrines and debates. I have 
suggested that these criteria formed the basis of an empirical, 
experimentalist and mathematical language of objectivity  geared toward 
pragmatic, functionalist and technological notions of efficiency. The adoption 
of these criteria, I have argued, made progressively the holistic notion of 
Nature obsolete because such knowledge remains non-amenable to an 
empirical and verifiable account under the methodology privileged by the 
positivistic model of science. The realization is that within our current 
predominant paradigm of knowledge, which is increasingly dominated by  an 
instrumentalist vision of science, can perfectly function without the need of a 
holistic or normative notion of Nature.
I have then formulated a series of interrogations problematizing the 
valuation of what-stands-on-its-own from an ecological standpoint, ending up 
suggesting that the remaining problem with “Nature” is not so much about 
what Nature is per se (a field of inquiry now gladly left to biologists and 
physicists), but rather with the possibility of grounding human freedom when 
a deterministic account of Nature is evoked. This problem, I suggested, 
emerges at the juncture we find between the deterministic and materialistic 
assumptions embedded in the scientific worldview, and its reception by a 
modern mind still uncomfortable with the unilateral collapse of humanity in a 
deterministic Nature, or (sometimes) vice versa. Reframing the body/soul 
dualism first popularized by Christianity, the seventeenth century mechanist 
view of Nature we still find at the heart of our modern worldviews contributed 
to this tension between what is believed to be a soulless world reducible to 
empirical/mathematical predictions and manipulations, and the element of 
human consciousness itself believed to be irreducible to empirical 
determinism. Human consciousness must indeed be posited irreducible to 
determinism if the experience of synthetic knowledge of otherwise scatters 
empirical data, freedom, morality and law ought to be possible. 
In other words, what-stands-on-its-own became associated with the 
notion of will (human and/or divine) generating a twofold ontological order 
primarily composed of two independent realities: the unpredictable element 
of human will and the deterministic element of the empirical world in which it 
emerges and evolves. The unsettling question thus became: which order of 
reality comes first, triggering interrogations such as: are our thoughts shaping 
how we perceived reality? Or are our thoughts an epiphenomenon of 
something more fundamental and empirical? If humans are also part of 
Nature, and the bodies and behaviors also amenable to empirical/
mathematical predictions (i.e. subject to determinism), are we really free or 
even accountable for our tendencies and actions? In this context, Nature is 
either placed at the limit of what is believed to be an aprioristic mode of 
consciousness, or described as a contingent cultural construct justifying 
societal taboo, political and social inclusions. 
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In both case, we can see that Nature falls prey of our anthropocentric 
reductionism and solipsism. On the one hand, we are depriving Nature of any 
mode of agency, consciousness or intrinsic finality  in order to secure both 
what is believed to be properly (and often superiorly) human. On the other 
hand, we reduce Nature to the status of ever-shifting cultural narratives with 
no way of knowing what Nature truly is, at least certainly not as a whole.
It is here that I propose the notion of a relational ontology to formulate 
an integrative and comprehensive ontology based on the notion of 
relatedness. I see in a relational ontology as a reversal of the ontological 
valuation of what-stands-on-its-own for the valuation of what-stands-in-
relations. Inspired by recent ecological findings that suggest the intrinsic 
interdependency of all living beings, a relational ontology can be understood 
as an invitation to value the dynamic and open relations by we emerge on an 
equal standing. It is an invitation to replace the assumption that we ought to 
start by  securing the primacy of what-stands-on-its-own (or what stand 
independently) by a more flexible and open assumption suggesting that we 
ought to attune ourselves to the various relationships by which we emerge, 
evolve and eventually pass away. The argument justifying a shift from one 
ontological valuation to another cannot ultimately  be subject to strict empirical 
method of verification; it remain a metaphysical choice that we have to make, 
hence the word valuation.25  Yet there are still good reasons to prefer one 
ontological valuation to another when it comes to the problem of thinking 
Nature. For instance, we can think of the inductive conclusions coming from 
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25 Our understanding of reality or Nature always presupposes specific ontological valuations 
(such as the valuation of what-stands-on-its-own), which makes untenable this idea of a 
strictly impermeable division between the realms of what is (facts) and ought to be (value). 
The ought/is distinction is itself a metaphysical construct in the sense that it cannot be 
proven by the methodology that sustains its inference. The notion of “fact” for example, 
which separates values from objective realities, cannot itself be empirically proven or 
experimented upon; it is metaphysical construct we create in order to isolate arbitrarily an 
object we posit independent from another one, by which we then try to understand the 
relation between the two (or more). Our understanding of a “fact” already presupposes a 
specific understanding of reality based on the metaphysical assumption that there is a reality 
independent from our minds. This assumption remains metaphysical in the sense that it 
cannot itself satisfy the scientific criterion of empirical falsification or verification via the 
framework of the scientific method. It becomes a “factualist worldview” when the 
methodological operation by which we construct “independent facts” becomes the 
justification for the theory positing that the world is ontologically made of objects that 
necessarily correspond to the structure of “facts” as we imagine them to be. Similarly, it 
becomes a “realist worldview” when we jump from the assumption that we are ultimately 
referring to the same objects or entities by virtue of communicating about them to the 
conclusion that there is only one true reality out there to which only one mode of knowledge 
can truly correspond (an assertion we cannot prove by the methodology used to construct 
“facts”); and furthermore a scientific worldview when we assume that all of human knowledge 
ought to be reduced to the cognitive criteria developed by the scientific method.
ecological studies suggesting a dynamic ontological state of interrelatedness 
working at a fundamental level in-between living species sharing an 
ecosystem (and of course in-between a living being and its ecosystem as 
well), and the ethical effects that this shift in valuation may produce on 
human behaviors.
To be clear, I am not condemning worldviews because they hold 
metaphysical assumptions that cannot be proven scientifically. On the 
contrary, I hold that it is quite inevitable for any theory of knowledge or 
worldview not to posit a number of foundational metaphysical assumptions 
that cannot be proven in a scientific manner. I am simply suspicious when 
worldviews assume that their metaphysical assumptions are not what they 
are: namely, posited assumptions that allow, but also limit, the expression of 
a mode of knowledge about what a group of significant relations that can 
loosely be labeled as one’s experience of reality. After all, by proposing a 
relational ontology I also suggest a metaphysical idea as foundational: that of 
relationality. One of the main differences I see between a relational ontology 
and an ontology valuing what-stands-on-its-own is a shift of focus from 
identifying and valuing what ought to exist first or independently, to identifying 
and valuing relations as the base of our experience of reality  via a more 
reciprocal, intrinsic, interdependent and equalitarian model. It reverses the 
main valuation at the center of the Western understandings of Nature we 
have examined in this article: a relational ontology is an understanding of 
reality that no longer needs to search for the first or most independent being, 
element or reality to organize its knowledge of reality, or to assume that there 
is a single reality beneath our many approximations of it. It rather bases its 
knowledge of reality  on an immanent appreciation of the differences that 
compose and structure its given in a dynamic and open fashion. 
We should be careful, however, not to oppose cultural expressions 
and relationality, as if culture were only a distortion of something more true 
and authentic. Of course, the knowledge of relationality  necessarily  emerges 
through specific cultural narratives and experiences, which more or less 
accept or negate other cultural expressions of the relationality they share. By 
the expression “the relationality they share” I do not mean a more primordial 
reality; relationality rather constitutes the immanent and immediate 
experience through which we experience both the difference and the unity of 
our conditions as interrelated and interdependent beings. Inspired by the 
formulation of Robin Durie, the project of suggesting “relational ontologies” 
can be seen as an invitation to begin from relations as such, from which the 
sense of entities or regions as emerging from these relations is viewed as 
derivative, rather than beginning from some static conceptions of ontological 
regions, and then seeking how these “regions” may interact (Durie 2002, p. 
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162).26  It is to view our “attributions” or “designations” as possessing a 
“double expressivity” to the extent that they are fundamentally relational and 
differential at the same time.
Adopting a relational ontology can create a broader sense of 
ecological relatedness without compromising the processes of differentiation 
without which the notions of singularity and discrimination are lost. The notion 
of relational ontologies can help us to understand Nature as an active field of 
infinite relationships through which emerge various singular entities by virtue 
of the relationships they have with other than themselves to begin with. As 
such, Nature designates what always exceeds in a differential mode—and 
yet sustains—our conceptual constructs from the outset. In other words, a 
natural being is not considered ontologically  independent by virtue of that 
which cannot be fractioned anymore at the risk of destroying what makes it 
precisely that (the atomistic view); what is irreducible are rather the inter-
constitutive relations that all living beings have with other than themselves by 
which they may receive, sustain and transmit life. To use Aristotelian 
formulation, we could say that no passage from potentiality  to actuality can 
rely solely on its own; the passage to actualization requires infinite 
interactions, which themselves can be viewed as integral to any form of 
actualization. Nature thus appears as a relational and open matrix of infinite 
relationships through which various natural beings constitute themselves 
through multileveled states of interactions and exchanges by which cyclical 
processes of regeneration, reproduction and destruction can be maintained.
By understanding Nature as an active, responsive and dynamic web of 
infinite relations in synch with the activities of our consciousness, we can 
relax the grip of the Idealist\Realist paradigm which makes Nature or Reality 
either the product of our minds (either subjectively or culturally) or a pre-
existing and objective reality  that our minds can only approximate.27  Both 
Nature and our minds emerge equiprimordially in our experience of the world; 
that is through an ontological state of both differentiation and unity  from the 
outset. As the Latin etymological root of the word “consciousness” formed by 
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26 On the subject of relationality and the possibility of thinking a metaphysic or relatedness, 
see the excellent work of Oliver 1981, 1984, 2006. I am indebted to Oliver for many of my 
insights of the topic.  
27 As Purser, Park and Montuori suggests: “Our observations should not be interpreted to 
mean that the environment or Nature is merely the artefact of a collective social construction. 
That would amount to a form of ecological solipsism. Nature is not simply a product of the 
social world; it has properties that exist independent of humans (photosynthesis in plants has 
survival value and occurs regardless of our view of Nature). Rather, we are only trying to 
draw importance to the fact that social-construction processes are involved in shaping 
concepts of and relationships to Nature—that such processes are intertwined with 
epistemological, ontological, and ethical issues” (Purser, Park and Montuori 1995, p. 1058).
the coalescence of cum (“with”) and scio (“know”) already suggest, to be 
“conscious” means to “know with”; it suggests both a relation to something 
beside oneself (the introduction of a difference we may relate to), and a state 
of awakening to the experience of that relation itself. In that regard, nothing 
would be more remote as a point of departure for the experience of 
consciousness than a mono-understanding of either divinity or the soul or 
any notion of atomic being. From a relational standpoint, there is no single 
point of departure for consciousness. Consciousness rather consists in an 
integrative and expending mode of relating to what is always already beside 
itself to begin with. In other words, a relational standpoint can be seen as an 
encouragement to experience ourselves as constituted through an ever-
expanding, dynamic and boundlessness relationality, which makes the limits 
between inside\outside a secondary topic if we agree that what constitutes 
our singularities and unity are mediated through dynamic and open relations 
which generate both simultaneously. As a result, the need to assert one’s 
cosmology, identity, nationality or any other self-referential concepts by 
excluding (or barely tolerating) others can also be relaxed. A relational 
commitment to ontology can help us to understand that the epistemological, 
pragmatic or metaphysical criteria by which an agreement could be 
negotiated must not precede, but rather emerge immanently from the 
encounters themselves. 
The adoption of a relational standpoint could also produce an 
interesting alternative to the enduring debate opposing the One and the 
Many (or Singularity and Universality or Monism and Pluralism), casted in 
mutually  excluding terms since at least the time of Parmenides and 
Heraclites.28  Adopting a relational paradigm by which relations are 
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28 See on this topic the excellent analysis of Colin E. Gunton in The One, the Three and the 
Many. God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity (1995). Gunton does a fantastic job at 
outlining the problems associated with both the tradition of Monism (One) and its counter he 
sees in pluralism (the Many), suspicious, under its modern form, of the tendencies of Monism 
of encouraging a conception of unity which suppress human particularity and freedom (p. 
213). Gunton is also critical of Modernity and its dogma he describes as this implicit belief 
“that the prime reality is the human will which is ontologically either so distinct from the rest 
of the world or so continuous with it that the only conceivable orientations are the 
alternatives of domination or resignation” (p. 219). He advocates a notion of relationality to 
overcome this impasse, and as a basis to rethink our relationship with God. Although his 
analysis of Modernity is remarkable and his critique of immanentism truly insightful, I must 
condemn Gunton’s anthropocentricism sadly typical of Christian dogmatist thinkers in 
remarks such as this: “Personal beings are social beings, so that of both God and man it 
must be said that they have their being in their personal relatedness: their free relation-in-
otherness. This is not so of the rest of the creation, which does not have the marks of love 
and freedom which are among the mark of the personal” (p. 229. The emphasis is mine). I 
am also puzzled by his remarks that associate immanent version of relationality, Modernity 
and atheism (see Durie 2002 for example) with the demonic (p. 38, 72, 89).    
  
understood as that which both unites and differentiates us at an ontological 
level could initiate a profound shift impacting not only on our comprehension 
of Nature, but also on the Western conception of the self, which is mostly 
understood in atomistic terms as an agent progressing from dependency to 
independency as a sign of maturity (rather than focusing on increasing well-
being through interdependence and interrelatedness).29 Such shift could also 
have significant impacts on the various Western cosmologies, haunted by the 
problem of finding a single cause or point of origin to the world (rather than 
accepting the impossibility  of having a single point of origin for the world if we 
accept a relational ontology) or by the hierarchical understanding of ontology, 
rating beings from dependent (inferior) to independent (superior). This could 
provide a conceptual canvas to negotiate our differences from an immanent 
standpoint, without imposing or sacrificing any universality and particularity 
that may be expressed in the experience in question. A relational ontology 
could help us to open ourselves to the plenum of an encounter, and to better 
attune with what we may perceive as otherness by inviting on an equal 
standing the relations by which the singularities of each and everyone—
humans, non-humans and more-than-humans—are revealed. 
Relationality surely hints toward a number of ethical guidelines built 
into the relational dimension of our existence; providing that we accept the 
notion that we are interrelated and interdependent ecological beings. It calls 
for the maximization of equal standing with other beings and the appreciation 
of diversity  as an asset to an open understanding of relationality, motivated 
by the desire of dynamically harmonizing ourselves with the wellbeing of all 
other creatures and ecosystems known to us. Of course, this relational 
worldview can still be opposed by the dominance of worldviews insisting on 
the accumulation of a knowledge that can be immediately useful to humans, 
mostly  under the scope of new technologies that allow us to master our 
environment, principally in extracting and transforming “natural resources” 
more efficiently. But the suggestion of a relational paradigm is precisely 
questioning the values at the center of the modern understanding of reality, 
showing that the cult of infinite accumulation, growth, power and domination 
can be replaced by an understanding of reality based on a different valuation, 
namely a mutualistic and relational valuation of wellbeing for all sentient and 
non-sentient beings. It also challenge the dualistic tradition that has cultivated 
the assumption so far nowhere found in Nature that what is pure, uncaused, 
immaterial, eternal and so on, is superior to its contrary. It asserts that, on the 
contrary, cultivating what binds us together as interdependent beings in a 
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29 As Purser, Park and Montuori suggest, the Egocentric mode of organization which 
predominates in Western societies assumes a self-contained individual, “a sovereign agent, 
whose personal sense of identity is constructed and felt to be contained within the  ‘private’ 
boundary of his or her skin-encased body. As such, ‘Egocentric organizations’ conceive of 
their identity as existing in opposition to the larger socio-ecological environment” (Purser, 
Park and Montuori 1995, p. 1062-64).
direction that maximize the wellbeing of all parties involve is a better wisdom 
than modeling on such mono-fantasy to cultivate selfish, greedy, solipsistic 
and anthropocentric conceptions of what is a successful life. 
As such, we can see that pledging for a relational ontology is more 
than just positing that the world is constituted of relations that would precede 
the units we perceived as tangible, hence real. A relation, after all, can still be 
asymmetrical, hierarchical or unjust. In other words, there is no link of 
necessity between valuing relations and the normative commitment to a 
greater equality among all those in relation. But the normative implications of 
adopting a relational ontology should be seen as either necessary or not, 
thus valid or not; it is after all an ontological valuation, meaning an invitation 
to think consciously the fabric of our world in a different light, to challenge the 
basis by which one begin to claim a privileged or superior status over 
another, to see that at a fundamental degree the reunion of the opposite held 
by our binary logic—yet without flattening the singularities upon which thrive 
relationality. It is an invitation to understand the power of our valuation at the 
heart of our understanding of reality  that can be directed toward a caring, 
empathic, mindful and loving wisdom that understand that our identities are 
not something to close, assert and defend, but rather a momentary and 
perhaps too brief opportunity to open up, to share and commune with the 
greater mysteries that surround us.
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